Indeterminacy of definitions and criteria in mental health: case study of emotional disorders.
The concept of emotions has gone through radical transformations during the last couple of centuries. Despite these severe re-specifications of its content, the concept of emotions (and especially some such as depression or anxiety) has acquired a central role in contemporary clinical Psychology and Psychiatry. This creates an apparent paradox, utilizing more and more concepts for which no clear conceptual understanding has been obtained. This paradox creates a challenge for researchers as well as clinicians, as on a daily basis, millions of people are currently ascribed with 'having' or 'being in' emotional states, which also entails certain interventions to be applied, without much clear insight into what exactly those states might really constitute. Conceptual research in aetiological and historical transformation of theoretical accounts of emotions as well as an overview of relevant empirical research on fundamental emotions. Examining of critical respective questions such as: whether there are any universal 'typical' emotional reactions to be found in each and every known culture, indicating their intrinsic existence as being a part of the human condition; whether there are 'basic' and 'secondary' emotions; whether emotions are merely bodily events, patterns of behavioural reactions to given types of stimuli or whether they rely inevitably on their cognitive content; whether emotions are necessarily intentional (in Brentano's sense) viz. are inevitably about a real or an imaginary object or whether there can be objectless emotional states; whether emotions are in a significant sense rational or fundamentally irrational responses and so forth. Moreover, more recent experimental data advocating for one or the other response to the aforementioned fundamental questions are scrutinized. In both conceptual research (including the works of thinkers such as the highly influential contributions of Darwin, James, Cannon, Freud, Ryle and Sartre or contemporary attempts such as the ones of theorists like Solomon, Nash, Rey, Pugmire and Lyons) as well as in comprehensive theoretical schemes combining experimental data (such as the ones provided by the works of Schachter and Singer, Ekman and Friesen, Panksepp, Damasio and Griffiths), there seems to be a radical indeterminacy of conceptual content and fundamental features of emotions in general, as well as of particular emotional states. Furthermore, there is an apparent conceptual incapability to include each and every feature of emotional states within a single comprehensive definition without making reference to contingent particularities of their biological instantiation. At least in the crucial concept of emotional states, when examined carefully, it seems that (1) there are substantial barriers to the ambitious quest for a scientific grounding of taxonomies and definitions of phenomena like emotions, due to the inability to provide an independent verification of scientific propositions; (2) all major approaches in Psychology and Psychiatry seem to have serious shortcomings in defining emotions; (3) such shortcomings have to do with fundamental issues such as the nature of mental states; (4) most ordinary concepts of emotions utilized by clinicians and researchers tend to be circular and question begging when scrutinized theoretically; and (5) historically dominant beliefs, values and cultural systems tend to influence heavily both the acceptability of such representations of emotions as well as their very nature.